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CUTTING DOWN DAMAGES 
AWARDS IN TIMBER TRESPASS 
CASES 
Dana M. Diehr* 
ABSTRACT 
The Alaska Supreme Court recently heard two cases addressing damages 
awards for timber trespass claims. Both cases, Wiersum v. Harder and 
Chung v. Park, emphasized the difficulty of obtaining restoration damages 
and the close scrutiny given to the size of the damages award itself. This Note 
explores the history of timber trespass and the current method by which 
courts determine the appropriate damages award. The Note also proposes a 
possible alternative to the current reticence toward restoration damages in 
which the plaintiff may elect to receive restoration damages but would be 
required to use those damages to restore their trees. 
INTRODUCTION 
A. A Timber Trespass Hypothetical 
You own a plot of land in the Matanuska-Susitna Valley, on which 
you have built a cabin overlooking a river and enveloped by numerous 
mature Sitka spruce trees. Work and family obligations keep you busy 
during the week but you sneak out to the cabin every weekend to 
unwind. In five years, when you retire, you hope to move to the cabin 
full-time to be surrounded by nature. 
Marring this idyllic vision is your contentious relationship with 
your neighbor, Ms. McAdams. Her plot overlooks your land, which sits 
between hers and the river. Some of your tall trees partially block 
McAdams’ view of the water. Annoyed, McAdams hires men to cut 
down the tallest of your trees to create a panoramic view for her cabin. 
You are outraged by the loss of trees because their beauty was one of the 
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reasons for your purchase of the land. When you consult a nursery 
about replacing the trees, the arborist tells you that shipping in mature 
spruce trees would cost $25,000. 
How much of this cost should be borne by Ms. McAdams? It seems 
to you that she should pay the whole $25,000 cost to replace the trees she 
cut down. But what if, putting your sadness aside, your land’s fair 
market value has gone down only $5,000 or has not decreased at all as a 
result of McAdams’s behavior? In fact, it’s possible that your plot is 
actually worth more with the trees removed. Under that circumstance, is 
it still fair to make McAdams pay the $25,000? Or is it unfair to make 
you bear the cost of planting replacement trees yourself because the fair 
market price does not accurately capture the value your spruce trees 
added to the land? 
This hypothetical involving the destruction of trees on the property 
of another was traditionally covered by the common-law tort of 
trespass.1 However, in Alaska and several other states, statutes create an 
alternative cause of action for such cases.2 
One of the earliest cases in the United States regarding timber 
trespass is E.E. Bolles Wooden-Ware Company v. United States,3 in which 
the Supreme Court grappled with the valuation of felled trees.4 Courts 
today still struggle to determine the appropriate amount of damages in 
timber trespass cases because the costs of restoring mature trees often 
outweigh the land’s diminution in market value. 
B.  Alaska’s Timber Trespass Statute 
The state of Alaska quickly recognized timber trespass claims in its 
courts. The timber trespass statute, Alaska Statute § 09.45.730, was 
enacted in 1962.5 Though there had been cases involving the destruction 
or removal of timber under common-law trespass claims before Alaska’s 
statehood,6 the earliest case to reach the Alaska Supreme Court under 
 
 1.  ERIC M. LARSSON, Causes of Action for Damages Resulting from Timber 
Trespass, § 2, in 45 CAUSES OF ACTION (2d ed. 2010). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  106 U.S. 432 (1882). 
 4.  See id. at 433. Trespassers intentionally cut and removed trees on 
plaintiff’s land. After being felled, the trees on the ground had a value of only 
about $60. Id. However, the trespassers carried the trees a long distance to town, 
where the timber was purchased for $850. Id. The Court determined that $850 
was the correct valuation of the timber, in part because an award of the lesser 
amount would encourage trespassers to continue to cut and abscond with 
timber. Id. at 433–36. 
 5.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.730 (1988). 
 6.  E.g., Duffy v. Strandberg, 5 Alaska 353 (D. Alaska 1915); McQuilan v. 
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the timber trespass statute was Mertz v. J.M. Covington Corporation in 
1970.7 The current version of the timber trespass statute reads: 
A person who without lawful authority cuts down, girdles, or 
otherwise injures or removes a tree, timber, or a shrub on (1) 
the land of another person or on the street or highway in front 
of a person’s house, or (2) a village or municipal lot, or 
cultivated grounds, or the commons or public land of a village 
or municipality, or (3) the street or highway in front of land 
described in (2) of this section, is liable to the owner of that 
land, or to the village or municipality for treble the amount of 
damages that may be assessed in a civil action. However, if the 
trespass was unintentional or involuntary, or the defendant 
had probable cause to believe that the land on which the 
trespass was committed was the defendant’s own or that of the 
person in whose service or by whose direction the act was 
done, or where the timber was taken from unenclosed 
woodland for the purpose of repairing a public highway or 
bridge on or adjoining the land, only actual damages may be 
recovered.8 
C. Other States’ Statutes 
Other than Alaska, forty-two states also have statutes relating to 
timber trespass.9 A Missouri court suggested that separate statutory 
timber trespass actions beyond common-law trespass are necessary 
because “[s]tatutory trespass attempts to redress plaintiff for injuries 
that often have intangible qualities, such as aesthetic value, and such 
damages are often difficult to measure.”10 While many states’ statutes 
resemble Alaska’s in focusing on the destruction and removal of trees, 
some states have enacted statutes targeting the impermissible 
destruction or removal of various natural resources, including trees. 
Although discussion of each of these states’ statutes is beyond the scope 
 
Tanana Elec. Co., 3 Alaska 110 (D. Alaska 1906). 
 7.  470 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1970). 
 8.  § 09.45.730. 
 9.  LARSSON, supra note 1, § 37. The forty-two states are: Alabama, Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 10.  Hale v. Warren, 236 S.W.3d 687, 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting 
Ridgway v. TTnT Dev. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 428, 435–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
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of this Note, the Washington and Oregon statutes deserve greater 
attention because of the shared Pacific Northwestern environmental 
context of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon. 
Oregon’s statute applies to trespasses that result in damage to or 
destruction of trees, produce, or other vegetation.11 Like Alaska’s statute, 
it allows for the collection of treble damages in cases where the trespass 
was committed “willfully, intentionally and without plaintiff’s 
consent.”12 Washington’s statute13 applies to natural resources more 
generally than either Alaska’s or Oregon’s statutes; it covers timber, 
crops, minerals, and any other valuable resource from the land.14 A 
separate statute,15 which addresses only the destruction or removal of 
timber, specifies that any award for timber trespass is subject to treble 
damages, regardless of defendant’s knowledge or intent.16 
It is no surprise that these states have enacted statutes to protect 
trees on private lands, as economic and environmental issues 
surrounding timber loom large in the Pacific Northwest’s public 
discourse. Alaska has enormous forests scattered across the state for a 
total of 129 million forested acres.17 Unsurprisingly, Alaska is home to 
the two largest national forests in the United States.18 There are boreal 
forests throughout Alaska’s interior and southern central region.19 Along 
the southeast, there are coastal rainforests like those in Washington and 
Oregon.20 Meanwhile, in Oregon and Washington alone, there are 
sixteen national forests that attract large numbers of tourists.21 For the 
Pacific Northwest, careful stewardship of the region’s timber resources 
 
 11.  OR. REV. STAT § 105.810(1) (2014). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.630 (1999). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  § 64.12.030 (2011). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Alaska Forest Facts, ALASKA FOREST ASS’N, http://www.akforest.org/ 
facts.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2016). 
 18.  The Tongass National Forest is the largest national forest in the United 
States, while the Chugach National Forest is the second largest. Id. 
 19.  Id. (“The forests found in Alaska’s interior are known as Boreal Forests. 
These forests extend from the Kenai Peninsula to the Tanana Valley near 
Fairbanks, and as far north as the foothills of the Brooks Range. They stretch 
from the Porcupine River near the Canadian border and west down the 
Kuskokwim River valley.”). 
 20.  Id. (“The coastal rainforest begins in southern southeast Alaska, and 
extends through Prince William Sound, and down the Kenai Peninsula to [the] 
Afognak and Kodiak Islands.”). 
 21.  The U.S. Forest Service highlights the beauty of these sixteen Pacific 
Northwestern forests in its tourism video. Visit Your Pacific Northwest National 
Forest, Pacific Northwest Region, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/r6 (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
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is important for the local economy, environment, and identity.22 In 
Oregon and Washington, the logging industry has been cut back in 
order to protect the region’s sensitive environment.23 
The timber industry remains an important part of Alaska’s 
economy.24 Recently, however, environmentalists have lobbied and filed 
lawsuits to curb logging in the Tongass National Forest.25 The Forest 
Service in Alaska is trying to balance the tension between the 
conservation of forests and the economic benefit the timber industry 
provides. 
I. MECHANICS OF DAMAGES AWARD CALCULATIONS 
A.  Compensatory Damages based on Diminution of Fair Market 
Value 
At trial, the amount of damages for most timber trespass claims 
equates to the diminution of the land’s fair market value as a result of 
the trespass.26 Although Alaska has not yet calculated damages this way, 
at least one other state court has held that the value of the lost timber 
itself can be recovered in addition to the diminution in fair market value 
of the land.27 
In order to determine the loss of fair market value, testimony by 
 
 22.  See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGION 
ALMANAC 1, https://fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5378417 
.pdf (“These [public lands, including National Forests] provide the people and 
communities of the Pacific Northwest their livelihood, recreation, visual 
backdrop, and identity.”). 
 23.  Id. (“The wetter west-slope vegetation zones were aggressively logged 
during the last few decades. Timber harvest has declined substantially due to 
environmental and Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive (TE&S) species 
concerns.”). 
 24.  Alaska Forest Facts, supra note 17 (“Today, Alaska’s forest products 
industry provides hundreds of jobs and contributes millions of dollars to 
Alaska’s economy. Furthermore, each direct timber job creates at least three 
indirect jobs for doctors, retailers, teachers, and more.”). 
 25.  Michael Wines, In Alaska’s Tongass, a Battle to Keep Trees or an Industry, 
Standing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014, at A22 (“Environmental groups filed three 
lawsuits against the Forest Service last month. Perhaps the most significant of 
them contends that further logging threatens an already struggling Alaskan 
wolf, defying a federal law requiring the service to protect wildlife on its 
lands.”). 
 26.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1979). 
 27.  LARSSON, supra note 1, § 22 (“At least one court has held that it is 
possible to recover statutory damages for the value of timber removed, plus a 
diminution in value of the land if there is identifiable loss separate from the 
removal of the timber.”) (citing Sells v. Robinson, 118 P.3d 99, 107 (Idaho 2005)). 
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both the landowner and experts is admissible.28 “In Alaska, lay 
testimony offered by the landowner as to property value is admissible 
because of the owner’s presumed knowledge about the value of such 
property.”29 Additionally, real estate agents familiar with the property 
and the neighboring area can provide expert testimony on the 
diminution of the land’s fair market value.30 
B.  Statutory Treble Damages 
Many plaintiff landowners are not limited to recovery of actual 
damages because Alaska Statute section 09.45.730 allows for recovery of 
treble damages in timber trespass cases, with three exceptions.31 Treble 
damages punish defendants for intentionally removing trees from 
another’s property, and thereby discourage them from committing 
timber trespass again.32 
There is an exception for unintentional trespasses that result in 
damage to plaintiff landowner’s trees.33 One example would be an 
unintentional fire on the defendant’s property, which spreads to the 
plaintiff’s land and destroys his trees. For unintentional or involuntary 
trespasses, treble damages would fail to discourage future trespasses by 
the defendant, because the forces behind these trespasses, such as fires, 
are difficult to predict and control. 
Treble damages are also not awarded where the defendant had 
probable cause to believe that his destruction or removal of plaintiff’s 
trees was permissible.34 Here, probable cause means “an honest and 
reasonable belief” that the defendant had the “authority to enter and cut 
on the property.”35 Because a reasonable belief is required for probable 
 
 28.  See Osborne v. Hurst, 947 P.2d 1356, 1361–62 (Alaska 1997). 
 29.  Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281, 286 (Alaska 1983) (citing 
Wernberg v. Matanuska Elec. Ass’n, 494 P.2d 790, 795 (Alaska 1972)). 
 30.  See Osborne, 947 P.2d at 1362. The court allowed the expert testimony of 
a “certified residential specialist” and “certified residential broker” familiar with 
the plaintiff’s lot and neighborhood. Id. The expert had explained that “her job 
require[d] her to be familiar with the value of real property and that she [was] 
frequently asked to give ‘a fair market value or a fair estimation value’ of 
property.” Id. 
 31.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.730 (1988). 
 32.  LARSSON, supra note 1, § 24 (“Generally, the recovery of statutory 
damages multipliers is regarded as a substitute for punitive damages for the 
intentional or knowing removal of agricultural products from the land of 
another, and it follows that it is improper to award both treble damages and 
punitive damages against a defendant for the destruction of such products.”). 
 33.  Matanuska Elec. Ass’n v. Weissler, 723 P.2d 600, 608 (Alaska 1986). 
 34.  E.g., id. 
 35.  Id. 
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cause, a defendant who cuts down another’s trees because of a negligent 
mistaken belief that he had permission lacks “probable cause.”36 In such 
cases, treble damages would be unduly punitive on less culpable 
defendants who had no intention of trespassing on the plaintiff’s 
property. 
However, even if the timber trespass did not fall within one of the 
three exceptions, courts may only award treble damages if the plaintiff 
demands them in his complaint.37 If the plaintiff does request treble 
damages in the pleadings, then the defendant bears the burden of 
proving that his actions fell within one of the three exceptions.38 
C.  Restoration Damages 
While damages based on the diminution of fair market value are 
the norm, courts in Alaska may award restoration damages in certain 
cases. The Alaska Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 929 approach for determining damages in trespass claims.39 
Section 929 reads in relevant part: 
(1) If one is entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting 
from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction 
of value, the damages include compensation for 
(a) the difference between the value of the land before the 
harm and the value after the harm, or at his election in an 
appropriate case, the cost of restoration that has been or 
may be reasonably incurred.40 
Because restoration damages would be inappropriate in cases 
where the land could not be restored, restoration damages are only 
awarded when the harm to the land is not “fixed and irreparable.”41 
In determining whether restoration damages are appropriate, 
Alaska courts look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929, Comment 
(b).42 Comment (b) advises that disproportionately large restoration 
damages are only appropriate when the landowner has a “reason 
 
 36.  Id. (“Here, [defendant]’s negligence ‘verg[ing] on recklessness’ negates 
any probable cause to cut the affected trees. [Defendant]’s negligence in 
believing it could cut the trees made its mistake unreasonable. The probable 
cause exclusion will not limit [defendant]’s liability.”). 
 37.  McQuillan v. Tanana Elec. Co., 3 Alaska 110, 112 (D. Alaska 1906). 
 38.  Weissler, 723 P.2d at 604–05. 
 39.  See G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379, 
1385–86 (Alaska 1974) (applying the Restatement approach). 
 40.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1979). 
 41.  G & A Contractors, Inc., 517 P.2d at 1386. 
 42.  Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282, 288 (Alaska 1981). 
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personal” to him that justifies the expense of restoration.43 As an 
example, Comment (b) provides that “when a garden has been 
maintained in a city in connection with a dwelling house, the owner is 
entitled to recover the expense of putting the garden in its original 
condition even though the market value of the premises has not been 
decreased by the defendant’s invasion.”44 In Andersen v. Edwards,45 the 
Alaska Supreme Court wrote, 
We believe the appropriate rule is that if the cost of restoring 
the land to its original condition is disproportionate to the 
diminution in the value of the land caused by the trespass, the 
restoration measure of damages is inappropriate unless there is 
a ‘reason personal to the owner’ for restoring the original 
condition.46 
There is no set method of deciding whether there is a sufficient 
reason personal to the plaintiff that justifies restoration damages. Rather, 
there are multiple factors about the land and its owners that should be 
considered at trial, with none of the factors being necessarily dispositive. 
The Alaska Pattern Jury Instructions § 13.05 for Trespass Damages 
informs jurors: 
To determine whether there is a reason personal to the plaintiff 
for restoring the property, you may consider the nature of the 
property, how it was used, the likelihood that the plaintiff 
 
 43.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt. b. Comment (b) reads in part: 
Even in the absence of value arising from personal use, the reasonable 
cost of replacing the land in its original position is ordinarily allowable 
as the measure of recovery. Thus if a ditch is wrongfully dug upon the 
land of another, the other normally is entitled to damages measured by 
the expense of filling the ditch, if he wishes it filled. If, however, the 
cost of replacing the land in its original condition is disproportionate to 
the diminution in the value of the land caused by the trespass, unless 
there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the original 
condition, damages are measured only by the difference between the 
value of the land before and after the harm. This would be true, for 
example, if in trying the effect of explosives, a person were to create 
large pits upon the comparatively worthless land of another. 
Id. 
 44.  Id. However, some other jurisdictions may award disproportionate 
restoration damages whether or not the plaintiff has a “reason personal,” if an 
award of diminution of fair market value would be unjust. See B.A. Mortg. Co. v. 
McCullough, 590 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding that the 
particular facts of the case warranted deviation from the standard fair market 
value damages calculation in order to prevent defendants from evading liability 
for the unlawful re-gradation of plaintiff’s land). 
 45.  Andersen, 625 P.2d at 282. 
 46.  Id. at 288. 
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would actually restore it, or any other factors you think are 
important.47 
Given this nebulous factors test, a close examination of timber 
trespass cases in which restoration damages were demanded provides 
the most insight into what generally qualifies as a “reason personal” to 
the plaintiff. In Andersen v. Edwards, the court found that the plaintiff 
lacked a reason for requesting restoration damages.48 The defendant, a 
development corporation, wrongfully cut more trees than necessary on a 
section line easement through plaintiff’s land in order to build a public 
road.49 The plaintiff expressed his concern to the defendant about the 
possible destruction of trees on his land before construction of the road 
began. The defendant assured the plaintiff that the construction “would 
do as little damage to the area as possible”; nevertheless, defendant 
cleared almost the entire one hundred foot width of the easement, 
despite the road’s much smaller twenty-five foot width.50 
After the jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in restoration damages, 
the defendant appealed.51 The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that “the trial court erred in using the cost of restoration as the measure 
of damages in this case.”52 The court determined that the destroyed trees 
did not possess “beauty, location, quality, size or other particular 
features” that would make them “of peculiar value to the landowner.”53 
The court concluded that the lack of reason personal to the plaintiff to 
restore the trees made it unlikely that the plaintiff would use the 
damages to actually restore the land.54 
In Osborne v. Hurst,55 the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the 
court should have considered whether the plaintiffs, a married couple, 
possessed a “reason personal” that justified restoration.56 The court 
remanded for a jury trial because sufficient evidence existed to support 
 
 47.  Trespass Damages, in ALASKA CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 13.05 
(1996). 
 48.  Andersen, 625 P.2d at 288–89. 
 49.  Id. at 284. 
 50.  Id. at 285. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 288. 
 53.  Id. at 289. Therefore, “[t]he severed trees were without special value 
beyond the fact that they were located on the [defendant]’s property . . . . 
Consequently, we hold that the diminution in value of the property or the 
economic value of the timber cut was the appropriate measure of damages.” Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  947 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Alaska 1997). 
 56.  Osborne, 947 P.2d at 1360. 
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the finding of a reason personal to the plaintiffs by a jury.57 The plaintiffs 
testified in depositions that they bought their property because of “its 
unique views, its abundant trees, and the unusual juxtaposition of the 
trees, the cabin, and the views.”58 In addition to claiming that none of 
the nearby properties were comparable, the plaintiffs stated that they 
intended to use their property as their primary residence after 
retirement.59 Thus, the plaintiffs’ special circumstances might have 
convinced a jury that a restoration damages award disproportionate to 
the land’s diminution of fair market value was reasonable.60 
Likewise, in G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc.,61 the 
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff landowner “use[d] its 
property for purposes peculiar to its business” and “therefore 
restoration [was] necessary.”62 The plaintiff, Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 
owned a thirty-acre parcel of land, through which a creek ran 
downstream from the defendant’s land.63 This land was used for the 
operation of a horticulture business.64 The plaintiff wanted the property 
to be a “garden showplace” for his business, as well as a “recreation 
area” and arboretum.65 
The defendant, G & A Contractors, Inc., owned a fifty-three acre 
land parcel, through which the creek also ran.66 It intended to develop 
its property into a multi-family housing development.67 The defendant 
needed to divert the creek running through the property in order to 
develop the land.68 During the excavation of land to divert the creek, 
“heavy earthmoving equipment” hired by the defendant trespassed on 
plaintiff’s land numerous times.69 These trespasses resulted in 
“extensive damage to trees and ground cover” on plaintiff’s property.70 
This damage prevented the plaintiff from using its property to 
display the variety and quality of trees and other plants available 
through its nursery business.71 The total damages award against the 
 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  517 P.2d 1379 (Alaska 1974). 
 62.  Id. at 1382. 
 63.  Id. at 1381. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
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defendant was $15,661.25, of which $12,555 was attributable to the 
destruction of various trees and vegetation.72 Defendant argued that the 
award of restoration damages for the destroyed trees and vegetation 
was unreasonable and that diminution of fair market value was the 
better measure of damages.73 However, the Alaska Supreme Court was 
not persuaded because the defendant did not prove that the damages 
amount was clearly erroneous or unreasonable in light of the trial 
court’s finding that plaintiff had a sufficient reason personal to restore 
its property.74 Because maintaining the trees on its land was necessary 
for Alaska Greenhouses, to continue its business, the court held that the 
plaintiff had a personal reason warranting restoration damages.75 
II. RECENT CASES 
A.  Timber Trespass Claims in Alaska 
Although there have been a limited number of timber trespass 
claims in Alaska,76 two recent Alaska Supreme Court cases highlight the 
dual difficulties these claims encounter: determining whether the 
plaintiff has a genuine “reason personal” and determining what amount 
of restoration damages would be “objectively reasonable.” 
B.  Wiersum v. Harder 
In Wiersum v. Harder,77 the plaintiff-respondent, Paul Harder, filed a 
timber trespass claim against defendants Darlene and Joel Wiersum 
 
 72.  Id. at 1382. 
 73.  Id. at 1385–86. Interestingly, defendant argued that diminution of fair 
market value of the land was the more appropriate measure of damages because 
the damage to plaintiff’s land was “permanent.” Id. at 1386. However, defendant 
presented no evidence that the injury to the land was permanent, which would 
have made planting new trees futile. Id. Furthermore, defendant failed to show 
the trial court’s finding on restoration damages was clearly erroneous. Id. 
 74.  Id. at 1386. 
 75.  Id. at 1382, 1385. 
 76.  Since its inception in 1962, only eleven cases under the statute have 
reached the Alaska Supreme Court. See Chung v. Rora Park, 339 P.3d 351 
(Alaska 2014); Wiersum v. Harder, 316 P.3d 557 (Alaska 2013); Hayes v. A.J. 
Assocs., Inc., 960 P.2d 556 (Alaska 1998); Osborne v. Hurst, 947 P.2d 1356 
(Alaska 1997); Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Wissler, 723 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1986); 
Shane v. Rhines, 672 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1983); Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282 
(Alaska 1981); Scavenius v. City of Anchorage, 539 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1975); 
Mertz v. J. M. Covington Corp., 470 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1970); Rohaley v. Compere, 
2004 WL 2260293, No. S–11004, at *1 (Oct. 6, 2004); Coffel v. Larsen, 1988 WL 
1514913, No. S–2186, at *1 (Sept. 28, 1988). 
 77.  316 P.3d 557 (Alaska 2013). 
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after the Wiersums cut numerous trees on plaintiff’s land.78 Harder 
bought land in Kodiak in 1976, on which he built a small house he lived 
in for a number of years.79 Later, in 1982, he “subdivided the property 
into three lots: Lots 1A, 1B, and 1C.”80 The house stood on Lot 1B, which 
plaintiff sold to his sister, Lisa Wietfeld, in 1993.81 Although he lived 
outside of Alaska for the next fifteen years, Harder visited the property 
frequently and intended to build a cabin on Lot 1A “in the old growth 
forest for his retirement.”82 
The Wiersums then bought their property, which was adjacent to 
Lot 1A and also overlooked Lot 1B.83 Because the Wiersums could view 
Wietfeld’s cabin on Lot 1B, they believed Wietfeld owned all the 
property between Lot 1A and Lot 1B.84 In 2005, the Wiersums asked 
Wietfeld if they could cut down some trees on her property that might 
“‘come down with the wind’ and harm their property.”85 Wietfeld 
consented at the time but became upset when she saw that they had 
cleared the entire hillside, rather than removing a few potentially 
dangerous trees.86 In 2007, Harder visited the property again and 
discovered that the clear-cut hillside was on his land, and not Wietfeld’s 
Lot 1B.87 
Harder filed a timber trespass claim against the Wiersums in early 
2008.88 He sought restoration costs as well as statutory treble damages 
under Alaska Stat. § 09.45.730.89 The Wiersums argued in their answer 
that any liability should be apportioned between themselves and 
Wietfeld, and that statutory treble damages were inappropriate because 
they had probable cause for believing that Wietfeld owned all the 
property and had given them permission to cut down Harder’s trees.90 
The trial began in May 2010, during which both parties testified 
and presented expert testimony as to the costs of restoration.91 While 
Harder admitted that the property’s value of $27,500 had not been 
 
 78.  Id. at 559. 
 79.  Id. at 560. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 560–61. 
 91.  Id. at 561–62. 
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diminished due to the loss of trees,92 he testified that he wanted to 
restore the trees on Lot 1A because: 
As a boy, he had hiked across the property with his friends 
while hunting and fishing. He lived in the house that he had 
built on Lot 1B for several years. Even after he moved out of 
Alaska, he continued to fish in Kodiak in the summers and 
periodically spent time at the Monashka property with his 
family. He testified that he held on to the Monashka property 
for 34 years and that he intended to build a house and live on 
Lot 1A once his son graduated from college.93 
Furthermore, Harder testified that Lot 1A was a particularly 
beautiful and private area of the property because “the tall trees 
screened the neighboring houses from view.”94 Disturbed by the 
property’s loss of beauty and privacy following the trespass, he declared 
on the stand “It’s been . . . altered forever, and all I’m asking is that it’s 
repaired . . . I mean, I don’t want money. I want my trees back.”95 
In order to prove Harder’s intention to restore the land, he 
“testif[ied] to and submit[ted as] evidence a purported notarized 
‘contract’” to the jury.96 In the “contract” with the jurors, he promised 
that all restoration damages would be used solely to replant trees similar 
to those the Wiersums had destroyed.97 On appeal, the Wiersums 
argued that the jury should not have been allowed to consider the 
“contract,” as it in no way legally bound Harder to actually restore his 
land with the damages award.98 As will be discussed in greater detail 
below, the court agreed, noting that the jury could easily have been 
misled by the word “contract” and its implication of legal 
 
 92.  Id. at 561. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 96.  Id. at 570–71. 
 97.  Id. at 570. Harder’s proposed “contract” with the jurors read: 
I Paul Harder do hereby solemnly swear, at the risk of being 
prosecuted for fraud, to replant a minimum of 70 Sitka spruce trees and 
no less than 6500 square feet of understory on Lot 1A block 8 Monashka 
bay subdivision, if awarded restoration damages from the Harder 
versus Wiersum[]s law suit. I Paul Harder agree to use all those 
restoration damages solely for restoration and to plant the largest trees 
that the award will afford . . . . Paul Harder agrees that restoration 
damages shall be held in an escrow trust by his attorney Jill 
Wittenbrader and doled out as needed to complete the job. 
Id. at 573–74 (Carpeneti, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 98.  Id. at 571. 
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enforceability.99 The court ruled that this evidence was inadmissible and 
could not be considered in the determination of damages upon 
remand.100 
Following his own testimony, Harder presented the expert 
testimony of a forester, an arborist, and a horticulturist to establish the 
cost of restoration.101 The forester noted that almost seventy trees had 
been cut on Harder’s property.102 To transplant seventy nine to ten foot 
tall sitka spruce trees, Harder’s arborist estimated that it would cost 
$161,000.103 In addition, the arborist testified that another $162,000 
would be necessary to replace the property’s lost ground cover.104 Using 
a different technique for the transplantation of large trees, the 
horticulturist believed it would cost an astonishing $620,537 to restore 
plaintiff’s land.105 
The Wiersums testified about their mistaken belief that they had 
permission from Wietfeld to cut down the trees on Lot 1A, which they 
believed she owned.106 A real estate expert testified that Harder’s 
property in 2005 had a listing value of $30,000–$40,000 and that its value 
would only have been “minimally affected, if at all,” by the lost trees.107 
Finally, defendants’ arborist testified that restoration of Harder’s 
property would cost approximately $34,000.108 But this arborist 
suggested the transplantation of smaller Sitka pines from nearby areas 
of Kodiak than Harder’s experts suggested; furthermore, the arborist 
 
 99.  Id. Furthermore: 
Because contracts are widely recognized to be legally enforceable 
agreements, proposing such a ‘contract’ with the jurors was likely to 
have misled jurors into believing that Harder’s promise to restore his 
property was legally enforceable when it was not. The jury’s decision 
on the proper amount of damages could thus have been impermissibly 
influenced by a false belief that Harder was legally bound to use a 
damage award to restore his property. 
Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 561. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. In total, the arborist’s restoration strategy would have cost $323,000. 
Id. 
 105.  Id. Thus, the horticulturist’s restoration plan would cost almost double 
that of the arborist. 
 106.  Id. However, “they admitted that they did not check public records to 
verify ownership” of the property. Id. This undercut the reasonableness of their 
mistake. 
 107.  Id. at 561. Additionally, defendants’ real estate expert noted that 
Harder’s property had appreciated to a value of $50,000–$55,000 by 2009 despite 
the lack of trees. Id. 
 108.  Id. at 562. 
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included some additional funds to compensate for very tall trees that 
could not be replaced easily.109 The arborist stated “his restoration plan 
specifically took into account [Harder]’s interest in restoring the privacy 
that his property had previously enjoyed.”110 
Upon concluding their defense, the Wiersums requested a motion 
for a directed verdict on the theory that Harder could not prove there 
had been a diminution in the property’s fair market value.111 They also 
argued that the restoration cost estimates presented during trial were all 
unreasonable because they were disproportionate given the lack of a 
diminished fair market value.112 But the trial judge denied the motion.113 
Instead, the jury deliberated and found that Harder had a sufficient 
“reason personal” and would use any restoration damages to restore the 
property.114 They awarded him $161,000 in compensatory damages and 
found that he was entitled to statutory treble damages.115 The Wiersums 
filed a motion requesting the trial judge grant a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), reprising their argument that “the 
restoration cost damages awarded to the [plaintiff] are manifestly 
unreasonable as a matter of law in light of the zero diminution in the 
value of [plaintiff]’s property that resulted from the trees being cut.’”116 
The trial court denied defendants’ motion and the Wiersums 
appealed.117 
On appeal, a majority of the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court by ruling that the $161,000 in restoration damages was 
objectively unreasonable.118 But as Justice Stowers points out in the 
dissent, the court here overtook the fact-finding responsibility of the jury 
in order to substitute its own concept of reasonableness.119 When an 
 
 109.  Id. Defendants’ arborist used the “trunk formula method” to determine 
the value of the trees removed. Id. “This method determines the value of a lost 
tree by first identifying the price of a replacement tree that is ‘the largest 
common available size,’ and then measuring a cross-section of the lost tree and 
extrapolating its price based on the price of the replacement tree. The arborist 
testified that this method is used when it is not possible to replace exact trees 
due to their size or their growth in a forested environment where their root 
zones are intertwined.” Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 570. 
 119.  Id. at 578 (Stowers, J., dissenting). 
We have long relied on juries to serve as the quintessential collective 
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Alaskan court reviews the denial of a JNOV motion by a trial court, 
generally “the only evidence that should be considered is the evidence 
favorable to the non-moving party . . . .”120 Yet, in this case, where 
Harder’s experts testified that restoration of the trees could cost up to 
$620,537, the court ruled that the much smaller damages award of 
$161,000 reached by the jury was unreasonable.121 
Also grappling with what constitutes reasonableness in restoration 
awards, Chief Justice Fabe proposed an upper limit for the amount of 
reasonable restoration damages in her concurrence.122 She concluded 
that “compensatory damages to restore land based on a reason personal 
should not ordinarily exceed the total value of the property prior to 
trespass.”123 Because the restoration award of $161,000 was four times 
the highest estimate for the land’s pre-trespass value ($40,000), Fabe 
agreed with the majority that the restoration damages award was 
unreasonable and additionally suggested that, upon remand, the 
damages award should be capped at $40,000.124 
C. Chung v. Park 
The most recent timber trespass case heard by the Alaska Supreme 
Court, Chung v. Park,125 was decided on December 12, 2014. In this case, 
plaintiff-landowner Rora Park filed a timber trespass claim against her 
tenant Christopher Chung for clearing trees from her property without 
permission.126 
Around August 2007, Park leased a unit (Unit 13) on her property 
to defendant.127 In exchange for a reduced rent, Chung agreed to make 
 
‘reasonable’ person and entrusted them to make important factual 
determinations. A jury of twelve did exactly that here and arrived at a 
consensus after following proper jury instructions and evaluating 
conflicting evidence, and yet the court holds their determination was 
unreasonable. I disagree with this holding and therefore dissent from 
the court’s decision to vacate the damages award and order a new trial 
on damages. 
Id. 
 120.  Cameron v. Chang-Craft, 251 P.3d 1008, 1018 (Alaska 2011). 
 121.  Wiersum, 316 P.3d at 577 (Stowers, J., dissenting). 
 122.  Id. at 571 (Fabe, C.J., concurring). 
 123.  Id. at 572 (Fabe, C.J., concurring). 
 124.  Id. at 571–72. In support of her proposed rule, Chief Justice Fabe cites a 
Nebraska Supreme Court case, Keitges v. VanDerineulen, 483 N.W.2d 137 (Neb. 
1992), in which the court ruled that restoration costs could only be recovered up 
to the fair market value of the land before the trespass occurred. Id. 
 125.  339 P.3d 351 (Alaska 2014). 
 126.  Chung, 339 P.3d at 353. 
 127.  Id. at 352. 
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improvement to the unit and a chapel that also stood on the property.128 
Shortly thereafter, Chung purchased a lot (Lot 3) from Park adjacent to 
the leased property.129 
Chung had plans to build a house on Lot 3, for which he hired 
Glacier Masonry and Excavation, Inc. (Glacier) in August 2008.130 One of 
Glacier’s duties was to remove trees and vegetation from Chung’s lot.131 
An employee of Glacier, Tracy, cleared vegetation in the power line 
easement between Lot 3 and Park’s property while working on Lot 3.132 
When Glacier’s owner advised Tracy that he was working beyond 
Chung’s property and should work within Lot 3, Tracy responded “that 
he was clearing out there to get a view, and that he’d been paid by 
[Chung]” to do so.133 At that time, only between three and eight trees 
had been removed from the easement or Park’s property.134 
But, at trial, Park presented an expert who estimated that in total 
“562 trees were cleared from about a third of an acre of [plaintiff]’s 
property.”135 The trees that had been removed from Park’s property 
appeared to be those that stood “more or less directly behind the house 
built on [Chung]’s property,” presumably to create a better view.136 The 
expert testified that the cost of restoring these trees would be “over 
$400,000.”137 Despite this significant restoration cost, Chung’s expert 
testified that Park’s property likely did not decrease in value as a result 
 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. Aside from the Glacier owner’s testimony about Tracy’s clearing of 
trees, 
there was no direct evidence of who was responsible for removing the 
trees from Park’s property. Park testified that she saw workers on her 
property and that [defendant] told her that the workers cut the trees. 
But Park did not personally see anyone remove trees from her 
property. Although she suggested that [defendant] may have cleared 
the trees so that he could see a nearby lake from his house, [defendant] 
denied that his house had any view of the lake even after the trees were 
cleared. Nevertheless, he offered no alternative explanation for the 
trees’ disappearance. 
Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. “Aerial photographs presented by the parties indicate that some trees 
were removed from Park’s property near the border of Lot 3 between August 
2008 and September 27, 2008, and more trees were removed between 2008 and 
2009.” Id. 
 136.  Id. Additionally, “[t]imber debris, presumably from the cleared trees, 
was also discovered buried on Park’s property.” Id. 
 137.  Id. 
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of the trees’ removal.138 
Park testified at trial that she possessed a “reason personal” that 
would justify an award of restoration damages: 
I have a previous history of cancer, and this natural beauty of 
my yard is [a] healing spot for me, and . . . in the future I’m 
going to [live] here, after [defendant] move[s] . . . . [A]fter work 
I come by, see my property and see the natural beauty and the 
trees and all that. [W]hen I [saw] that all cut out it just [made] 
me very—[it] just [broke] my heart, and then very angry . . . . I 
don’t know how [I can] explain . . . it’s just my healing natural 
stop [sic]. [It] is just healing my health and [helping] me for 
day-by-day living, and then when I saw that it just really hurt 
my feeling[s] . . . .139 
However, the trial court did not credit her testimony and found 
that she had not established a “reason personal” for restoration 
damages.140 Nevertheless, the trial court awarded restoration damages 
for the lost trees in the amount of $23,500, as well as statutory treble 
damages, stating that “‘it would be reasonable both aesthetically and 
legally to award damages that would permit replacement of 
trees . . . .”141 
Defendant Chung appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, arguing 
that the award of restoration damages was clearly erroneous because 
plaintiff lacked a “reason personal” to restore the land and the 
restoration damages were disproportionate given the lack of diminution 
in fair market value of plaintiff Park’s property.142 Because the trial court 
had explicitly found that Park did not have a “reason personal,” the 
court ruled that restoration damages were inappropriate and vacated 
the award of damages. Furthermore, the court remanded the case back 
for the trial court to enter an award of only nominal damages because of 
defendant’s intentional trespass.143 
  
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 354. 
 140.  Id. The trial court was skeptical of Park’s testimony because she 
“downplayed her visits to the property later in the trial.” Id. 
 141.  Id. The $23,500 was the cost to restore fifty trees on Park’s property. Id. 
So, with the statutory treble damages, her total damages recovery for the timber 
trespass claim would have been $70,500. 
 142.  Id. at 353. 
 143.  Id. at 354. 
ARTICLE 4 - DIEHR (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  2:03 PM 
2016    CUTTING DAMAGES IN TIMBER TRESPASS CASES 117 
D.  Implications 
Wiersum and Chung imply that it is increasingly difficult to receive 
restoration damages in timber trespass cases. These cases reveal judicial 
skepticism and reticence toward awarding disproportionately large 
restoration damages. In Chung, the trial court approached plaintiff 
Park’s testimony under oath with great suspicion, refusing to accept her 
avowal of personal attachment to the property as a sufficient reason 
personal, even though the trial court still awarded her some restoration 
damages. Although the plaintiff Harder in Wiersum presented 
significant evidence of a “reason personal” that warranted an award of 
restoration damages, the court displayed its distaste for outsized 
restoration damages by rejecting the jury’s “unreasonable” restoration 
award. 
Thus, although Wiersum was technically a victory for the plaintiff 
who was able to prove a “reason personal” and recover some restoration 
damages, the case illustrates the difficulty of establishing just what 
amount of restoration damages is “reasonable.” While the estimated 
restoration costs presented by experts at trial seemed enormous, they 
were the necessary expenses of restoring the land to its original 
condition. In Wiersum, the jury chose the intermediate amount of 
damages estimated to restore the plaintiff’s lost trees; in fact, the jury 
awarded only half of the total restoration costs calculated by the 
plaintiff’s arborist.144 Nevertheless, the court implied that planting 
saplings and smaller trees is likely to be the most reasonable restoration 
possible, even when the plaintiff has lost numerous large trees.145 The 
majority wrote that “[i]n such cases, the achievement of a reasonable 
approximation of the land’s former condition may involve something 
less than substantially identical restoration . . . .”146 If that is the case, 
then the court seems to believe that leaving plaintiffs who have suffered 
an injury substantially less than “whole” is a reasonable resolution in 
timber trespass cases. 
Additionally, the Wiersum case quashes the unprecedented 
“contract” method undertaken by the plaintiff. While the implication of 
the “contract”—that plaintiff was legally bound to restore the 
property—was potentially misleading, this ruling still underscores the 
 
 144.  Wiersum v. Harder, 396 P.3d 557, 561 (Alaska 2013). The Harder’s’ 
arborist estimated that a total of $323,000 was necessary ($161,000 to restore the 
trees and $162,000 to restore the ground cover). Id. However, the jury awarded 
him only $161,000 for the restoration of the seventy trees. Id. at 562. 
 145.  See id. at 570 (citing Heniger v. Dunn, 101 Cal. App. 3d 858, 866 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1980)). 
 146.  Id. (quoting Heniger, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 865). 
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court’s distrust of plaintiffs who swear they will restore their land but 
might pocket the money as a large windfall instead. If the testimony of 
plaintiffs like those in Wiersum and Chung is insufficient to weed out 
which land owners will actually restore their property, then how should 
the courts determine which plaintiffs will likely use an award of 
restoration damages to restore their land? 
III. HOW SHOULD DAMAGES IN A TIMBER TRESPASS ACTION BE 
CALCULATED? 
The recent Alaska Supreme Court cases as well as other timber 
trespass cases across the country reveal competing conceptions of what 
makes the plaintiff “whole” after suffering loss as a result of another’s 
trespass. An undercurrent in these opinions and the Restatement of 
Torts (Second) discussion of restoration damages is that damages 
awards need to be calculated differently, depending on the plaintiff’s 
unique situation, in order to make the plaintiff “whole.” Thus, a plaintiff 
who values her land primarily for the privacy and immersion with 
nature it provides, like the plaintiff in Wiersum, requires restoration 
damages in order to recover the element of the land she most valued. 
But, for a developer or landlord who values his land primarily for the 
income it may provide, damages in the amount of the land’s diminution 
of fair market value sufficiently compensate him.147 While this 
 
 147.  For example, Christopher E. Brown, Comment, Dump It Here, I Need the 
Money: Restoration Damages For Temporary Injury to Real Property Held for Personal 
Use, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 699, 699–700 (1996) (footnotes omitted) provides 
an illustration of this intuitive difference: 
After a long day, you come home to find that the construction crew at 
the new homesite next door negligently drove a truck through the back 
yard of your dream house. The truck left deep ruts in the soil and 
destroyed all of your prized ornamental Japanese shrubs. The injury is 
temporary and restorable. Fully restoring the back yard and shrubbery 
will cost $20,000, but the market value of your property was lowered by 
just $2000. You are devastated and want nothing but to have your back 
yard restored to its original condition. Obtaining general damages 
equal to the cost of restoration would seem fair, and in almost any court 
in the United States you would be entitled to such recovery. 
 
However, imagine the same situation, but instead of ornamental 
shrubs, the truck destroyed unattractive yet hard to replace bushes. 
Furthermore, you never liked the house much anyway and were 
planning to move. You would appear to have hit the jackpot to the tune 
of $18,000. If you were to receive an award of general damages equal to 
the cost of restoration you then could sell the property for $2000 less 
than its pre-tort market value (i.e., its current market value), pocket the 
award of damages, and end up with an $18,000 windfall. 
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acknowledgment of the plaintiff’s subjective valuation of his land is 
appropriate, the burden placed on plaintiffs to convince juries that they 
possess an exceptional reason requiring the grant of restoration damages 
is unsatisfying: it creates the possibility that many plaintiffs who do wish 
to restore their properties but may not have enough evidence of their 
intention will fail to be made “whole” by a fair market value damages 
award. 
There are two understandable reasons for courts’ reluctance to 
award disproportionate restoration damages: (1) the desire to prevent 
economic waste and (2) the desire to prevent windfalls for plaintiffs who 
will not restore their properties.148 The problem with a focus on 
preventing economic waste is the presumption that any damages award 
larger than the diminution of a property’s fair market value is wasteful. 
But the assumption that the market provides the best estimate of a 
property’s value is often false—especially in the context of residences or 
land kept for reasons besides investment.149 That the landowner could 
sell the land without trees for a similar price should not obfuscate the 
fact that the landowner can no longer use their property to enjoy the 
trees—the purpose for which the landowner purchased the property. 
These landowners acknowledge an intrinsic value to trees that the 
market does not capture. Thus, without a damages award to restore the 
trees’ intrinsic value, defendants’ timber trespass leads to a complete 
loss of that value—itself a great waste. 
In Wiersum, the court believed that the large restoration award was 
wasteful, even though it was within the three experts’ spectrum of 
estimated restoration costs. But wasteful to whom? To the plaintiff in 
Wiersum, the damages award was not wasteful at all—it was the amount 
necessary to return the land to the condition in which it was useful to 
him as a nature retreat. Thus, “economic waste” is an inappropriate 
focus for courts because the major purpose of damages awards is to 
make the injured plaintiff “whole,” which requires an orientation 
toward the individual plaintiff’s valuation of their property.150 What 
renders the plaintiff “whole” varies from case to case; therefore, 
diminution in fair market value of land does not always serve as a 
sufficient proxy for how much the plaintiff has lost. 
The second great concern of courts surrounding disproportionate 
 
 148.  Id. at 706. 
 149.  See id. at 702–03 (noting when courts diverge from fair market value in 
coming to the “best” estimate of a property’s value). 
 150.  See United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958) (“The 
fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party, as nearly as 
possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of 
the other party.”). 
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restoration damages is the potential windfall to plaintiffs who will not 
use the award to actually restore their properties. Undoubtedly, courts 
should be concerned with preventing windfalls to landowners with no 
intention of restoring trees on their land. But requiring landowners to 
prove that they have a sufficient “reason personal” and that the 
restoration damages will be used to restore the land is an even greater 
problem because it creates a greater obstacle for plaintiffs to be made 
“whole.” What evidence could a landowner present to prove that their 
attachment to his property ensures he will restore the land? In Wiersum, 
the plaintiff’s long ownership and visitation of the property was a 
significant factor, yet his “contract” was ruled inadmissible on appeal. 
And the trial court in Chung refused to credit the plaintiff’s testimony 
that she loved to use her property as a nature retreat and was saddened 
by the loss of trees. 
Even if the plaintiff is able to convince the court or jury about his 
intentions to restore the property, the court may still reject a restoration 
damages award as unreasonable because the award is 
disproportionately large compared to either the land’s diminution of fair 
market value or the property’s pre-trespass value. Such ceilings on 
restoration damages awards, like the ceiling based on the property’s 
pre-trespass value suggested by Justice Fabe in Wiersum, are not ideal 
solutions to the problems of “economic waste” and potential windfalls. 
Some jurisdictions have adopted similar damages ceilings that cap a 
restoration damages recovery to the amount of the property’s 
diminution in value, limiting the plaintiff’s ability to restore their 
property even more than the ceiling suggested by Chief Justice Fabe.151 
  
 
 151.  James R. Cox, Reforming the Law Applicable to the Award of Restoration 
Damages as a Remedy for Environmental Torts, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 777, 789 
(2003). 
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Other courts have noted the negative ramifications of damages 
ceilings: 
Such ceilings on recovery not only seem unduly mechanical but 
also seem wrong from the point of view of reasonable 
compensation. If the plaintiff wishes to use the damaged 
property, not sell it, repair or restoration at the expense of the 
defendant is the only remedy that affords full compensation 
. . . . [Also,] [t]o hold that appellant is without remedy merely 
because the value of the land has not been diminished, would 
be to decide that by the wrongful act of another, an owner of 
land may be compelled to accept a change in the physical 
condition of his property, or else perform the work of 
restoration at his own expense.152 
Thus, in a jurisdiction with a diminution in fair market value 
damages ceiling, even a defendant who intentionally cut down a 
plaintiff’s trees to better his own view against the plaintiff’s will would 
only have to pay the plaintiff nominal damages if the destruction of 
trees does not lower the property’s fair market value. Such a defendant 
would be unjustly enriched by his enhanced view while the plaintiff 
would have to use his own money to replant any trees. This result is a 
windfall for the defendant, and is economically wasteful because it 
forces the plaintiff to absorb costs that never would have been realized if 
not for the defendant’s wrongful conduct. If there must be a risk of a 
windfall or “economic waste” in determining damages awards, should 
not the defendant bear that risk? 
IV. PROPOSED CHANGE TO DAMAGES DETERMINATIONS 
A.  Allow Plaintiffs to Choose the Method for Damages Calculations 
Because landowners often purchase properties based on the land’s 
subjective desirability, which may include the privacy or immersion in 
nature that forested land provides, restoration damages are often a 
better measure of the injury suffered by landowners when their trees are 
destroyed. Moreover, a system that grants restoration damages can still 
avoid the dangers of windfalls to landowners who do not intend to 
restore their property. 
This Note proposes to allow plaintiffs to recover restoration 
damages, even if they are disproportionate to the diminution of the 
 
 152.  Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans v. Louisiana 
Gas Servicing Co., 618 So. 2d 874, 877 (La. 1993) (internal quotations omitted). 
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land’s fair market value, if they agree to use the damages award to 
actually restore the property. The landowners could sign an agreement 
stipulating that he will actually restore his land with restoration 
damages, like the one made by the plaintiff in Wiersum. But rather than 
using this agreement to influence the fact finder as to the plaintiff’s 
sincerity, the agreement would be legally enforceable as an actual 
contract with either the court or the defendant.153 
Admittedly, this suggestion would create some administrative 
difficulties. The courts would have to track how plaintiffs who chose 
restoration damages spend the award to ensure compliance with the 
restoration agreement. One option would be to keep the funds in a 
constructive trust or an escrow account so that the dispersal of funds 
could be monitored.154 This approach would have the added benefit of 
potentially minimizing the restoration damages that are paid out—any 
funds left over in the account after a reasonable restoration of the 
property has been made could be returned to the defendants.155 If the 
courts did not have the duty of checking on plaintiffs’ restoration of the 
land, then perhaps that burden could fall to the defendant, just as one 
member of a contract must bring a breach of contract claim against the 
other. 
Additionally, an exception to the statutorily mandated treble 
damages could be made for restoration damages. Thus, a landowner 
could choose to recover three times the diminution in his land’s fair 
market value or the amount required to restore the lost trees on the land. 
Under this scheme, a landowner who lacks the motivation to restore the 
land would be more likely to choose the treble damages award. Only 
landowners who do have personal reasons to restore their land would 
forego the treble damages award in order to restore their trees. 
Moreover, by abolishing treble damages for restoration damage 
awards, there would be a significant reduction in potential “economic 
 
 153.  Others have suggested that the award of restoration damages should be 
predicated upon one’s use to restore the land. In the mineral rights context, for 
instance, “[t]o ensure [the land’s restoration], the landowner should be required 
to use the monetary award for actual costs of restoration.” Brian Pollock, Note, 
Pillaging the Land: Consideration of Judicial Control of Damage Awards to Prevent 
Windfalls at the Expense of the Environment, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 419, 421 
(2009). 
 154.  See Cox, supra note 151, at 802–03 (noting that, in the environmental 
contamination context, courts that award restoration damages may need to 
create constructive trusts to ensure that the plaintiff actually restores the 
property). 
 155.  “Court supervision of this award will also allow for a more accurate 
award of the actual cost of restoring the property to its pre-injury status.” 
Pollock, supra note 153, at 421. 
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waste.” For example, in the Wiersum case, plaintiff was awarded 
$161,000 in restoration damages, which would come to a total of 
$483,000 after trebling. If the Alaska Supreme Court had embraced 
Justice Fabe’s proposed ceiling based on the land’s pre-trespass value, 
then plaintiff’s total recovery would have been $120,000—treble the 
$40,000 value of the property estimated by defendants’ real estate 
expert. When comparing the proposed $120,000 damages award’s 
ceiling to a $161,000 restoration, non-treble damages award, the 
damages are close enough in value to avoid the appearance of 
significant “waste.” 
B.  Public Policy Benefits of Restoration Damages 
As discussed earlier,156 the Pacific Northwest benefits significantly 
from its swaths of old-growth forests. People who purchase highly 
forested land, especially those who build residences on that land, value 
these trees—the plaintiffs in both Wiersum and Chung testified that the 
beauty of the trees and natural surroundings motivated their property 
purchases. Thus, maintaining a timber trespass statute that lessens the 
burden on plaintiffs who are trying to restore the natural beauty of their 
property is good public policy for Alaska because it best enables its 
citizens to be made whole following injurious trespasses. Alaskan 
forests possess great aesthetic and environmental value that is not 
always best quantified by the land’s market price.157 
Of course, maintaining economic efficiency is also a concern of the 
state, but a more liberal system of restoration damages is not antithetical 
to that interest. Removing the statutory multiplier where plaintiffs 
request restoration damages and requiring plaintiff landowners to use 
their restoration damages to actually replace lost trees would keep 
damages awards lower and ensure that those funds are put to the best 
use—restoring the natural beauty of Alaska and giving landowners back 
the aesthetic enjoyment that was unlawfully taken from them. By letting 
plaintiffs pursue either restoration or diminution in fair market value 
damages, Alaskan courts would be taking into account the significant 
aesthetic and emotional attachment that many of the state’s citizens have 
for their properties. 
 
 156.  Supra Section I.C. 
 157.  “Economic value, while useful and relatively easy to calculate, does not 
adequately capture a forest’s worth.” Charles Riordan, Note, Calming the Fire: 
How a Negligence Standard and Broad Cost-Recovery Can Help Restore National 
Forests After Wildfires, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 233, 264 (2014). 
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CONCLUSION 
Timber trespass cases like Wiersum v. Harder and Chung v. Park 
exemplify the difficulty of crafting appropriate remedies where damage 
to real property has occurred. These cases reveal the inherent tension 
between the legal system’s dual imperatives to make plaintiffs “whole,” 
even taking the landowners’ idiosyncrasies into account, but also to 
prevent unduly punitive damages awards that could undermine 
citizens’ trust in the legal system and may burden defendants 
disproportionately to their fault. 
While harm to defendants is concerning, the current method by 
which Alaskan courts approach restoration damages treats plaintiffs 
with too much suspicion regarding their desire for restoration and too 
much doubt regarding the reasonableness of restoration damages, even 
when numerous experts have testified to the restoration costs. This Note 
suggests that plaintiffs should have the option of pursuing either 
restoration damages, with which they will be legally bound to restore 
the property and which will not receive a statutory multiplier, or 
damages based on the diminution in the fair market value of the 
property, which may be trebled. Plaintiffs who do possess a genuine 
“reason personal” to restore the land will opt for the stricter restoration 
damages while plaintiffs less attached to their properties will accept the 
fair market value damages. Thus, the court will not place the burden of 
proof on plaintiffs to convince judges and juries how much they love 
their properties; but, rather, allow plaintiffs to sort themselves 
appropriately based on their priorities. 
 
